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INTRODUCTION
When one thinks about discrimination, blatant acts or bad motives
usually come to mind. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (―Title
VII‖) protects against this type of intentional discrimination in the
workplace through its disparate treatment provision.1 Title VII also,
however, imposes liability even in situations where the employer acts
without bad intentions.2 An employer may be liable simply because one
group passes a neutral promotion test or meets a hiring qualification at a
substantially higher rate than other groups, even when the selection
criterion applies to everyone and is not devised to disadvantage one group
over another.3 Nevertheless, if an employer‘s neutral employment practice
causes a disproportionate impact on a racial group or other protected class,
it is a prima facie violation of Title VII‘s disparate impact provision.4 The
employer must defend the charge by showing that the employment practice
is job related and a business necessity.5 Mounting a defense may involve
1. Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
provide protections against employment discrimination by providing as follows:
(a) Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employments, because of such individual‘s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (emphasis added).
2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that even good
intentions are not a defense when an employer‘s selection criteria that are not job related
cause an adverse effect).
3. See id. at 431–32 (discussing the lack of discriminatory intent in designing tests or
criteria for promotion).
4. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(ii); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.

validating the test or selection criterion, which can cost $100,000–
$400,000.6 Even after an employer validates a business practice, the
employer may still be liable if there are other equally effective alternatives
that have less adverse effect.7
Consequently, the employer may be concerned about the racial
composition of its employees and may make race-conscious employment
decisions to avoid disparate impact liability. To the extent that employers
feel induced by the disparate impact provision to make such decisions, it is
possible that the provision violates the Equal Protection Clause because it
encourages employers to act on the basis of race.
In Ricci v. DeStefano,8 the city of New Haven faced this very
predicament and decided to void a promotion test given to firefighters
because it was concerned about disparate impact liability.9
A
disproportionate number of African Americans and Hispanics who took the
test failed.10 Under the four-fifths rule, a Guideline enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖), disparate impact exists
when the selection or pass rate of one group is less than eighty percent of
the most successful group.11 Had the minority firefighters sued, they would
have been able to show a prima facie case of disparate impact based simply
on the numbers.12 This potential litigation led the city to discard the test
results.13 Consequently, Caucasian firefighters and a Hispanic firefighter
who passed the test, and would likely have been promoted, sued.14 These
plaintiffs alleged that the city‘s action violated Title VII‘s disparate
treatment provision and the Equal Protection Clause.15
In Ricci, the Court resolved the disparate treatment issue under Title
VII16 but did not address whether the disparate impact provision violates
the Equal Protection Clause.17 Justice Scalia observed that the Supreme

6. See infra note 164 (discussing costs of validating selection criteria).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
8. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
9. Id. at 2664.
10. Id. at 2677–78.
11. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010).
12. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677–78. On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for each
racial group was the following: 58.1 percent for Caucasians, 31.6 percent for African
Americans, and 20 percent for Hispanics. Id. at 2678. On the captain examination, the pass
rate for Caucasians was 64 percent and for Hispanics and African Americans was 37.5
percent. Id.
13. Id. at 2664.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2681 (holding that the city needed to show a ―strong basis in evidence‖ that its
selection process would cause a potential disparate impact violation, which the city lacked).
17. The Court stated:

Court‘s resolution ―merely postpone[d] the evil day on which the Court
will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
consistent with the Constitution‘s guarantee of equal protection? The
question is not an easy one.‖18
This Article completes the initial inquiry I embarked upon to answer this
difficult question.19 In my prior work, I identified and examined six
compelling interests that might be asserted to justify the disparate impact
provision‘s racial classifications under an Equal Protection Clause
challenge: remedying past discrimination, smoking out discrimination
(intentional or unconscious), obtaining the benefits of diversity, providing
role models, satisfying an operational need, and providing equal
employment opportunity by removing barriers.20 I concluded that
removing barriers to employment might provide the strongest defense for
the disparate impact provision.21 This Article will explore whether the
disparate impact provision‘s use of racial classifications is narrowly
tailored to achieve these compelling interests. Although Title VII protects
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, this Article focuses on racial classifications, and a
discussion of other groups is beyond its scope.
Commentators have focused on other constitutional issues raised by the
disparate impact provision,22 but none have explored this particular
constitutional inquiry—whether the disparate impact provision is narrowly
tailored to pass strict scrutiny should ―the evil day‖ come when an Equal

Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken
here in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a
future case. As we explain below, because respondents have not met their burden
under Title VII, we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is
ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.
Id. at 2676.
18. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. See Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII‘s Disparate Impact Provision
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI.
L.J. 1, 8(2010).
20. See id. at 8–9.
21. See id. at 88 (discussing the removal of barriers as a compelling interest because it
affords people economic liberty and equality).
22. Much scholarship has been written about the validity of laws that prohibit disparate
impact, without a showing of intent, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Commerce Clause, and about whether neutral state action that has a discriminatory effect
but lacks a discriminatory intent violates the Equal Protection Clause. The latter point was
raised by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235, 237, 238–39 (1976). See Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493,
494–95 (2003) (discussing the Court‘s treatment of statutory disparate impact standards in
Washington v. Davis).

Protection Clause challenge is made. In fact, little scholarship has been
written about narrow tailoring generally.23
It is surprising that there is a dearth of scholarship discussing narrow
tailoring given its significance in the evaluation of governmental actions
that affect equal protection and individual rights.24 It is said that strict
scrutiny is ―‗strict‘ in theory and fatal in fact,‖25 but a review of the
Supreme Court‘s equal protection cases reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny
is fatal because of narrow tailoring. When governmental use of racial
classifications is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, strict
scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling purpose and that
the racial classifications be narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.26
The asserted governmental purpose may either be remedial (to remedy past
discrimination) or nonremedial (for some purpose other than to remedy
past discrimination).
The narrow tailoring requirement has been
particularly fatal in cases involving nonremedial interests. Korematsu v.
United States27 and Grutter v. Bollinger28 are among the few cases
involving nonremedial interests to survive strict scrutiny‘s requirement for
narrow tailoring, but in light of the universal condemnation of Korematsu,29
Grutter is the more viable example.
This Article explores whether the disparate impact provision can survive
strict scrutiny‘s narrow tailoring requirement by examining the factors

23. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don‘t Tell, Don‘t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (discussing how Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger changed the narrow tailoring analysis); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1996) (considering the types of affirmative action programs
that would pass the narrow tailoring requirement).
24. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (establishing that
local, state, or federal government action that implicates rights bestowed by the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause will be
reviewed with strict scrutiny).
25. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
26. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (invoking national security concerns for the government‘s
racial classifications during the internment of Japanese Americans).
28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (invoking an interest in diversity for the law school‘s raceconscious admissions program).
29. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―[T]he
Court . . . nonetheless yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification. . .
. Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks as prohibited.‖); Farag
v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (―[Korematsu] is now widely
regarded as a black mark on our constitutional jurisprudence.‖); Jonathan M. Justl, Note,
Disastrously Misunderstood: Judicial Deference in the Japanese-American Cases, 119
YALE L.J. 270, 278 n.34 (2009) (citing David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953,
993 (2002)) (pointing out that by 2002, eight Supreme Court Justices have stated that
Korematsu was incorrectly decided).

considered by the Court in evaluating this requirement.30 This Article
begins by briefly tracing the development of the disparate impact provision
and the four-fifths rule in Part I and explaining how the two are related.
Part II discusses the significance of narrow tailoring and the factors used to
evaluate whether the narrowly tailored requirement is met.
In Part III, this Article examines the first factor: whether the
enforcement of the four-fifths rule operates like a quota and draws a line on
the basis of race,31 or operates as a permissible goal, like in Grutter v.
Bollinger. Part III also considers whether Grutter‘s ―critical mass‖
approach, which did not refer to any specified number, is applicable to the
disparate impact provision.32 This Part concludes that while the law school
in Grutter may assess the attainment of diversity without reference to a
defined number of minorities, the critical mass approach is inapplicable
because the EEOC must refer to some sort of threshold to maintain
uniformity in enforcing the disparate impact provision. Additionally, the
EEOC must refer to a predetermined number or ratio as to what constitutes
disparate impact in order to provide notice and due process to employers.
Part IV considers the factors of individualized consideration and
flexibility. If the disparate impact provision functions as a quota, it is
unlikely to afford flexibility or individualized consideration. Whether a
race-conscious program is narrowly tailored is dependent upon whether
race is used as the decisive factor and whether case-by-case considerations
are possible.
Part V examines the scope and duration of the disparate impact
provision. The reasonableness of a program‘s scope depends upon its
ability to encompass only similarly situated persons for purposes of the
program and may be affected by the overinclusion or underinclusion of
people. Part V discusses whether the disparate impact provision‘s
probability for error would render it underinclusive or overinclusive and
whether the provision excludes white males from asserting disparate impact
claims, thereby making it underinclusive. Part VI explores whether the
provision‘s racial classifications are reasonable in duration or seek to
maintain racial balance.

30. I acknowledge that the application of the narrowly tailored requirement is fact
specific, and this Article will explore the question using general facts derived from the
Supreme Court‘s precedent. This Article does not make a normative argument regarding
whether the cases were rightly decided, but rather, accepts the Court‘s holdings as a basis
for analysis.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (rejecting set-aside program because it was ―a line
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status‖).
32. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (2003) (accepting the school‘s concept of ―critical
mass‖ as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity).

Part VII evaluates the final factor of whether the disparate impact
provision‘s racial classifications are necessary after consideration of raceneutral alternatives and whether there are race-neutral means to achieve the
compelling purposes previously identified.
Part VIII assesses the
likelihood of the disparate impact provision‘s survival, taking in
consideration the totality of the narrow tailoring factors.
This Article concludes that the disparate impact provision is unlikely to
pass the narrowly tailored requirement and risks being invalidated on ―the
evil day‖ when the provision is challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY AND PROVISION AND
THE FOUR-FIFTHS RULE
A. The Beginnings of Disparate Impact Theory in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court first adopted the disparate impact theory in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,33 in which the Court considered the breadth of Title VII‘s
protection against discrimination.34 In Griggs, an employer required
employees seeking jobs or promotions to have a high school diploma and
to pass an intelligence test.35 These requirements were applied equally to
Caucasians and African Americans36 but adversely affected African
Americans.37 The Court invalidated the employer‘s practices, concluding
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited ―not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.‖38
Thus, employers who act with good or non-discriminatory intent must
nevertheless justify employment practices that have an adverse effect by
showing a business necessity related to job performance.39
B. Congress‘s Passage of the Disparate Impact Provision
After Griggs, Congress codified disparate impact liability in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 provides:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if—

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id.

(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
40
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.

Section 703(k)(1) encompasses the same principles of disparate impact
articulated in Griggs by affording employers an opportunity to defend their
employment practice by showing that the practice is job related and
consistent with business necessity.41
Additionally, § 703 provides
plaintiffs an opportunity at the surrebuttal stage to show that the employer
refused to use less adverse alternatives.42 An employer‘s refusal to use
such options will render it liable under the disparate impact provision, even
if the employer‘s practice is job related and consistent with a business
necessity.43
C. The Four-Fifths Rule
The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII.44 In 1978, the EEOC
promulgated the four-fifths rule as part of its Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures45 that were designed to assist with compliance with
federal law prohibiting discrimination and to ―provide a framework for
determining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures.‖46 The
four-fifths rule has become an important rule because a violation of the rule
is a prima facie case of disparate impact.47 The four-fifths rule or eighty
percent rule provides as follows:

40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
41. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
42. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
43. Id. § 2000e-2(d)(1)(A).
44. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
45. Jacob Van Bowen, Jr. & C. Allen Riggins, A Technical Look at the Eighty Per Cent
Rule as Applied to Employee Selection Procedures, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (1978).
46. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Federal Register 38290,
38296 (Aug. 25, 1978).
47. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673, 2677–78 (2009)(―Under the
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an
employer uses ‗a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‘‖) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). The Supreme Court has stated that ―[u]less and until the defendant
[employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by
showing the stated elements‖ of disparate impact. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
2191, 2198 (2010). The four-fifths rule is an articulation of when the stated elements of
disparate impact has been met.

Adverse impact and the ―four-fifths rule.‖ A selection rate for any race,
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse
impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be
regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse
48
impact.

The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the Guidelines49 but has made
varying statements regarding the deference it accords to the Guidelines
generally. Griggs accorded the Guidelines ―great deference,‖50 explaining
that ―[s]ince the Act and its legislative history support the Commission‘s
construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing
the will of Congress.‖51 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody52 followed the
deference given in Griggs,53 opining that ―[t]he EEOC Guidelines are not
administrative regulations[] promulgated pursuant to formal procedures
established by the Congress.
But . . . they do constitute ‗[t]he
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.‘‖54
Additionally, in Ricci, the Court recognized the role of the Guidelines in
implementing the disparate impact provision.55
Since the promulgation of the four-fifths rule in 1978,56 the Supreme
Court has not explicitly approved or rejected this particular rule. The Court

48. The four-fifths rule also considers situations in which a ratio higher or lower than
four-fifths may constitute evidence of adverse impact. EEOC Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). See Marion Gross Sobol & Charles J.
Ellard, Measures of Employment Discrimination: A Statistical Alternative to the FourFifths Rule, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 381, 388–91 (1988) for an explanation of how to compute
disparities using the four-fifths rule.
49. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1319 (1987).
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971).
51. Id. at 434.
52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
53. Id. at 431 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34); see also Dean Booth & James L.
Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law,
29 EMORY L.J. 121, 128 (1980) (stating that Albemarle ―represents the ‗high-water mark‘ of
deference to the 1970 Guidelines‖).
54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)).
55. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (citing EEOC Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)(2008)) (applying the four-fifths
rule). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated, ―Recognizing EEOC‘s ‗enforcement
responsibilities‘ under Title VII, we have previously accorded the Commission‘s position
respectful consideration.‖ Id. at 2699–700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The circuit courts, however, ―have accorded them a limited degree of deference. The circuit
courts have generally accepted the guidelines as expert advice on technical issues, but not as
binding authority on questions of statutory interpretations.‖ Rutherglen, supra note 49, at
1319.
56. Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 648. In addition to the EEOC, the
Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and the Department of Labor used the

in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust57 viewed the four-fifths rule as ―not
provid[ing] more than a rule of thumb for the courts.‖58 In United States v.
Paradise,59 the Court did not directly endorse the four-fifths rule but
acknowledged that the parties agreed to use the four-fifths rule to determine
the adverse effect of the selection procedure.60 The Court also provided an
illustration of the application of the four-fifths rule through an example.61
In Connecticut v. Teal,62 the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the fourfifths rule by recognizing the district court‘s uncontested finding that the
examination failed the four-fifths rule.63 The Court provided a more direct
discussion regarding the four-fifths rule in Ricci v. DeStefano, where the
Court applied the rule and concluded that ―[t]he pass rates of minorities . . .
fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the
disparate-impact provision of Title VII.‖64
Additionally, there is little agreement among commentators as to the
deference that should be accorded to the Guidelines. One commentator has
argued ―Congress did not intend the courts to defer [to] the EEOC
rulings.‖65 Congress empowered the EEOC to investigate charges of
employer discrimination and determine whether a reasonable basis exists
for the charges, but not to determine the existence of discrimination.66
Another commentator, however, has concluded that the Guidelines
should be viewed as ―more than informal.‖67 According to this view, the
courts have erroneously interpreted the Guidelines as being entitled to
deference but not binding.68 As the argument goes, this interpretation is a
mistake because the EEOC promulgated the Guidelines with the
participation of agencies empowered with substantive rulemaking

four-fifths rule to carry out their respective enforcement charges. Id. at
648–49.
57. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 995 n.3.
59. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 159 n.10 (―In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion
test pass it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass.‖).
62. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
63. Id. at 444 n.4; Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics,
Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 143
(stating that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved the eighty percent rule when it
noted that the petitioners did not contest the lower court‘s finding of disparate impact).
64. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009).
65. Michael Evan Gold, Griggs‘ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin
of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 485 (1985).
66. Id. at 485–86.
67. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV: Affirmation of Affirmative Action
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 910 (1993).
68. Id.

authority.69 Ultimately, the argument concludes that the Guidelines are
binding because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc.70 accords greater weight to agency statements resulting from
the rulemaking process.71
Despite the disagreement among commentators and inconclusive
remarks by the Court, the four-fifths rule remains critical in the
determination of disparate impact liability. Therefore, it is necessary that
this Article considers how the application of the four-fifths rule affects the
factors used in evaluating the narrowly tailored requirement.
II. NARROW TAILORING
When the government implements racially based policies, its policies are
reviewed under strict scrutiny.72 Strict scrutiny requires that racial
classifications be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
purpose.73 Strict scrutiny serves the following purposes:
[It] ―smoke[s] out‖ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool . . . [and] ensures that the means chosen ―fit‖ this
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
74
stereotype.

Narrow tailoring is the component of strict scrutiny that ensures ―the
means chosen ‗fit‘ [the] compelling goal.‖75 The Court has examined a
number of factors in determining whether governmental racial
classifications are narrowly tailored76: the use of quotas,77 the flexibility of
the program,78 the duration of the relief,79 the scope of the program,80
69. Id.
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
71. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 910.
72. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (―[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .‖).
73. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that all
restrictions based on racial classification are suspect unless justified by public necessity).
74. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
75. Id.
76. See generally Ayres & Foster, supra note 23 (discussing the Supreme Court‘s
approach to narrow tailoring after two recent decisions); Michael K. Fridkin,
The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justification for Racial Preferences in Public
Contracting,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 519 (2004) (discussing the narrow tailoring issue after Croson).
77. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 485, 505 (1989)
(invalidating a program that set aside thirty percent of contract-award value to Minority
Business Enterprises); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 320 (1978)
(invalidating medical school‘s admissions program that set aside sixteen seats for
underrepresented minorities).
78. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).

individualized considerations,81 and the necessity of the program compared
with the efficacy of race neutral alternatives.82 Because ―[c]ontext matters
when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause,‖83 evaluation of the factors for narrow tailoring in some instances
will depend on the compelling purpose asserted.
Whether the disparate impact provision must be narrowly tailored
depends upon whether it is subject to strict scrutiny review. Consequently,
because racial classifications may violate the Equal Protection Clause, a
preliminary determination of whether the disparate impact provision
implicates racial classifications is necessary. Relying on Ricci, this Article
assumes that Title VII‘s disparate impact provision uses racial
classifications. In Ricci, the Court characterized the city‘s action as
―express, race-based decisionmaking‖84 because the city voided the
examination scores as a result of ―the statistical disparity based on race.‖85
The Court explained that ―the City rejected the test results because too

79. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (―Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define
both the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such
findings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment
of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the
goal of equality itself.‖); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
80. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (―The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond‘s racial
preference strongly impugns the city‘s claim of remedial motivation.‖).
81. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (―As Justice Powell made clear
in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way.‖); Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (―Based upon proper findings, such
programs are less problematic from an equal protection standpoint because they treat all
candidates individually, rather than making the color of an applicant‘s skin the sole relevant
consideration.‖); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978)
(―The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his
race is the principal evil of petitioner‘s special admissions program.‖).
82. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995) (pointing out
that the circuit court failed to ―address the question of narrow tailoring in terms of our strict
scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there was any consideration of the use
of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in government contracting‖
(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507) (internal quotations omitted)); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171
(―In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several
factors, including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies . . . .‖);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (―The
term ‗narrowly tailored,‘ . . . has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as
commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely has
noted, the classification at issue must ‗fit‘ with greater precision than any alternative
means.‖ (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974))).
Another factor that the Court has considered is whether the use of racial classifications
―unduly harms members of any racial group.‖ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. Discussion of this
factor is beyond the scope of this Article because it is not directly applicable to the disparate
impact provision.
83. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
84. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009).
85. Id.

many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists
to be certified.‖86 Therefore, this Article proceeds on the premise that the
disparate impact provision uses racial classifications because it induces
employers to consider race when making employment decisions, triggering
strict scrutiny.87
III. QUOTA OR GOAL: LINE DRAWING, A NUMBERS GAME, OR A MATTER
OF SEMANTICS?
The use of quotas is one factor in determining whether the disparate
impact provision‘s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored. The
Court‘s treatment of quotas varies depending on whether there is a remedial
need for racial classifications. In cases involving a need to remedy past
discrimination, the Court has been more accepting of quotas.88 On the
other hand, in the absence of a remedial need, the Court has generally
rejected quotas but has permitted goals.89
This Part first provides a brief legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and its 1991 amendment codifying the disparate impact provision.
This Part also explores whether the disparate impact provision can be
properly characterized as a quota or a permissible goal in order to
determine if the provision is narrowly tailored. The analysis proceeds by
accepting the Court‘s jurisprudence regarding quotas because a normative
discussion of quotas is beyond the scope of this Article.

86. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
87. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain way.
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that
regulations that authorized, but did not require, employers to administer blood and urine
tests constituted state action because the government encouraged this practice).
88. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (―It is now well established
that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to
discrimination.‖); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
479 (1986) (emphasizing the measure‘s automatic termination once the remedial need ends);
Richard L. Barnes, Quotas as Satin-lined Traps, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 865, 867 (1995)
(―Judicially ordered quotas continue to have a place in remedying discrimination . . . .‖);
Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact
Theory
and
the
Demise
of
the
Bottom
Line
Principle,
31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 363–64 (1983) (―Indeed, judicially imposed quotas designed to
remedy unlawful discrimination and affirmative action quotas voluntarily instituted by
employers to serve as insulation from possible Title VII liability are commonplace and have
generally fared well under attack in litigation.‖).
89. C.f. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (discussing the difficulty in
classifying measures as remedial or illegitimate); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasizing the impossibility of determining whether the
measure at issue was remedial); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310
(1978) (explaining that a measure with without a remedial purpose was unjustified because
it imposed disadvantages on persons who bore no responsibility for the harms suffered by
the measure‘s beneficiaries).

A. Brief Legislative History Showing Apprehension of Quotas
Legislative history reveals that, prior to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, critics were concerned that the Act would require quotas.90
―[M]any opponents of Title VII argued that an employer could be found
guilty of discrimination under the statute simply because of a racial
imbalance in his work force, and would be compelled to implement racial
‗quotas‘ to avoid being charged with liability.‖91 Similar objections to
quotas resurfaced during the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.92
―[C]ounsel to three of the key Senate sponsors‖ revealed that the disparate
impact provision of the proposed Act triggered the quota objection because
the provision attempted to codify both liability for unintentional
discrimination and the business necessity defense.93
Senator Orin Hatch, for example, expressed his concerns:
[W]hat kind of a society do we really wish to establish? . . . [I]s it a
society that . . . requires every job in America to match perfectly the
numerical mix of the surrounding, relevant labor pool; a society where
94
every employment policy is governed by numerical quotas?

Ultimately, the fear of quotas led President George H. W. Bush to veto the
Civil Rights Act of 1990.95 President Bush stated, ―Primarily through
provisions governing cases in which employment practices are alleged to
have unintentionally caused the disproportionate exclusion of members of

90. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 453–65 (describing the congressional debates
surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and tracing the Act‘s development); Gold, supra
note 65, at 503–07.
91. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 463.
92. For discussions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
generally Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Andrew M. Dansicker, A Sheep in Wolf‘s Clothing:
Affirmative Action, Disparate Impact, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1 (1991); Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, ―Quotas‖ and the
Codification of the Disparate Impact Theory: What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?,
55 ALB. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (1991).
For an insider‘s perspective see C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact: History and
Consequences, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (1994); Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993). Peter Leibold, Stephen Sola, and Reginald Jones ―were
intimately involved in the negotiations surrounding the 1991 bill‖ as counsel to senators. Id.
at 1043. C. Boyden Gray played a key role during the negotiations of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 by serving as Counsel to the President of the United States. Gray, supra, at 1487.
93. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043–44.
94. Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A ―Quota Bill,‖ a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
287, 288 n.5 (1993) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 29,527 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
95. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and
Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913–14 (1993) (discussing the failure
of the 1990 Act).

certain groups, the [1990 Act] creates powerful incentives for employers to
adopt hiring and promotion quotas.‖96
Interestingly, the Democrats in both the House of Representatives and
Senate had adopted anti-quota language in the 1990 bill.97 Later, as a result
of compromise, the anti-quota language was deleted.98 Senator Dole and
the President explained that the anti-quota language was omitted because it
was unnecessary, as ―the bill was not a quota bill at all.‖99 In November
1991, after a tumultuous two-year battle, the President signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.100
B. The Court‘s Treatment of Quotas for Non-Remedial Need
Except for Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court has invalidated most cases
involving governmental racial classifications for nonremedial need,
purposes other than remedying past discrimination, under strict scrutiny‘s
narrowly tailored prong. In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke101 the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school‘s admissions
program, which set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats in its entering
class for minorities.102 Although the Court recognized that the medical
school‘s goal of advancing diversity was a compelling interest,103 the Court
held that the program was not narrowly tailored.104
In its defense, the medical school attempted to distinguish its program
from a quota. A quota, according to the medical school, is ―a requirement
which must be met but can never be exceeded, regardless of the quality of
the minority applicants.‖105 The medical school argued that its admissions
process was not a quota because there was ―no ‗floor‘ under the total
number of minority students admitted; completely unqualified students
[would] not be admitted simply to meet a ‗quota.‘ Neither [was] there a
‗ceiling,‘ since an unlimited number could be admitted through the general
admissions process.‖106
The Court rejected this ―semantic distinction‖ because sixteen seats were
reserved for minority applicants without competition from white

96. Id. at 913–14 (quoting Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990)).
97. See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914 (discussing the disappearance of the antiquota language adopted by both houses of Congress).
98. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914.
99. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043.
101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
102. Id. at 289.
103. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 320.
105. Id. at 288 n.26.
106. Id.

applicants.107 White applicants could vie only for eighty-four seats while
minorities were able to compete for all one hundred seats.108 The Court
concluded, ―[w]hether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is
a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.‖109
The Court, however, later found the distinction between a quota and a
goal significant.110 In Grutter, the Court upheld a law school‘s admissions
program that considered race as one factor to advance the school‘s
objective of attaining a ―critical mass‖ of diverse students in its entering
class.111 The Court declared that ―[t]o be narrowly tailored, a raceconscious admissions program cannot use a quota system‖ and validated
the law school‘s program because it did not rely on a rigid quota.112 As the
Court defined:
[A] quota is a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of
opportunities are reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.
Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or
which cannot be exceeded, and insulate the individual from comparison
113
with all other candidates for the available seats.

In contrast, ―a permissible goal requires only a good-faith effort to come
within a range demarcated by the goal itself, and permits consideration of
race as a plus factor in any given case while still ensuring that each
candidate competes with all other qualified applicants.‖114 Ultimately, the
Court decided that the admissions program fell within a permissible goal.115
Additionally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,116 the Court
invalidated a program that required contractors who were awarded city
contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the award to Minority
Business Enterprises.117 The city could not show a remedial need for the
program because there was no evidence of past discrimination by the

107. Id. at 289.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court compared the medical school‘s program to Harvard‘s, pointing out
that ―[i]n Harvard College admissions the Committee did not set target-quotas for the
number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted
in
a
given
year.‖
Id.
at
316
(citation
omitted).
By implication, the Court seemed to view the program in Bakke as a quota.
110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003).
111. See id. at 318 (defining critical mass as ―‗meaningful numbers‘ or ‗meaningful
representation,‘ which [the school] understood to mean a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated‖).
112. Id. at 334.
113. Id. at 335 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
115. See id. at 335–36 (―The Law School‘s goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.‖).
116. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
117. Id. at 477, 485–86.

city.118 The Court concluded that the thirty percent figure was a ―rigid
racial quota‖119 that was not narrowly tailored because race neutral
alternatives were available and it unrealistically assumed that minorities
will select a particular job in proportion to their representation in the local
population.120
C. The Court‘s Treatment of Quotas for Remedial Need
Quotas designed to remedy past discrimination have had greater success
in meeting the narrow tailoring requirement. For example, in Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers‘ International Ass‘n v. EEOC,121 (―Sheet Metal
Workers‖) the Court upheld a ―membership goal‖ imposed as remedial
relief for prior union discrimination against African Americans as being
narrowly tailored.122 Due to the union‘s ―long and persistent pattern of
discrimination‖ that had ―consistently and egregiously violated Title
VII,‖123 the district court established a twenty-nine percent non-white
membership goal.124 The Court concluded that the goal was necessary to
redress the ―lingering effects of past discrimination.‖125
The flexibility of the goal, evidenced by the district court‘s adjustments
in response to changes in the union, was another persuasive factor in Sheet
Metal Workers.126 The Court highlighted that the district court‘s flexibility
in adjusting the deadline for achieving the membership goal was evidence
that the goal was not a device for attaining and maintaining racial balance,
but ―rather [w]as a bench mark against which the court could gauge [the
union‘s] efforts to remedy past discrimination.‖127 Additionally, the
temporary nature of the goal—that the program would end as soon as the
union achieved the sought after membership—was significant in the
Court‘s analysis of whether the goal was narrowly tailored.128

118. Id. at 480.
119. Id. at 499.
120. Id. at 507.
121. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
122. Id. at 476–77. The court ordered goal in Sheet Metal Workers survived challenges
under equal protection and Title VII. See id. at 479–80 (stating that petitioners raised a
claim under the ―equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment‖).
123. Id. at 433.
124. Id. at 432.
125. Id. at 477. The Court did not review the appropriateness of the twenty-nine percent
figure because that figure had been set for at least ten years, the court of appeals had
affirmed that figure twice before, and the parties did not raise this particular issue for the
Court‘s review. Id. at 441.
126. Id. at 477–78.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 479.

In United States v. Paradise,129 the Court upheld another ―goal‖ intended
to redress past discrimination against African Americans by the Alabama
Department of Public Safety.130 The district court ordered the hiring of one
African American trooper for each Caucasian trooper until the state-wide
percentage of African American troopers reached twenty-five percent.131
Concluding that the one-for-one requirement was ―flexible, waivable, and
temporary,‖132 the Court explained that it was not a goal, but rather the pace
at which the twenty-five percent goal would be met,133 similar to the
objective in Sheet Metal Workers.134
D. Does the Disparate Impact Provision Impose or Operate as a Quota?
The disparate impact provision does not explicitly require quotas,135 and
in fact, § 703(j) of Title VII disavows any requirement for preferences on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.136 But this
disavowal is not sufficient to dispel the suggestion that the provision
operates as a quota.
An argument can be made that when the disparate impact provision is
applied, it falls within the definition of ―quota‖137 provided in Bakke and
Grutter.138 Similar to the quota in Bakke,139 the disparate impact provision
reserves a percentage exclusively for other racial groups without
competition. Under the four-fifths rule, if there is at least twenty percent
separation between the selection rate of the highest performing racial group
and other groups, then a plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of disparate
impact.140 In this way, the disparate impact provision essentially reserves a
129. 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1986).
130. Id. at 185–86. The Court also upheld quotas in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979), but this Article does not rely on Weber because it involved a voluntary
quota agreement entered into by private parties lacking state action and the parties raised
only a Title VII claim, not an Equal Protection challenge. See id. at 197 (describing a
collective bargaining agreement between employer and union).
131. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154–55.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id. at 179.
134. Id. at 180 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487–88 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
135. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―To be
sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas . . . .‖).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006).
137. I do not use ―quota‖ as a pejorative but rather as a label for programs that are not
permissible goals.
138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (identifying race as a factor in
determining admission to a law school); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 269–70 (1978) (noting the set-aside program was implemented to ensure a specified
number of minority students were admitted to the medical school program).
139. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (describing the medical school‘s policy of admitting a
prescribed number of minority students).
140. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010) (holding that a claim is
established by showing that an employer ―uses a particular employment practice that causes

representation rate that is eighty percent of the most successful group‘s
selection rate. Additionally, the Grutter Court permitted universities to
―consider race or ethnicity only as a ‗plus‘ in a particular applicant‘s file,
without insulating the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats.‖141 The disparate impact provision‘s twenty percent
reservation insulates groups from comparison, contrary to the program
approved in Grutter.142
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the disparate impact
provision as a permissible goal like Grutter‘s critical mass.143 One can
argue that the disparate impact provision functions like a goal because like
critical mass, the disparate impact provision does not establish a set number
needed to meet the goal.144 Even though the four-fifths rule equates to
eighty percent, it is set in relation to the group with the highest pass rate.145
Consider two examples. First, if Caucasians had the highest pass rate in
Ricci with one hundred percent passing the test, then there would be a
prima facie case of disparate impact if less than eighty percent of African
American firefighters passed. Second, assume again that Caucasians had
the highest pass rate, but with only fifty percent passing the test. In this
case, there would be a disparate impact if less than forty percent of African
American firefighters passed. Thus, there is no ―quota‖ because the
number of people required to pass in order to avoid prima facie liability
would depend on the group with the highest pass rate.
Also, the disparate impact provision can be characterized as a
permissible goal because it allows consideration of race plus other factors,
similar to critical mass. The provision does not rest solely on race but takes
into consideration other factors, such as whether the employment practice
is justified by business necessity and is job related and whether other
equally effective alternatives with fewer adverse effects exist.146
There are, however, several problems with equating the disparate impact
provision to critical mass. First, although there is no predetermined
number set by the disparate impact provision, there is a predetermined

a disparate impact‖ on one of the prohibited bases); EEOC Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010).
141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations
omitted).
142. See id. (explaining that the policy allowed race to be considered in ―a flexible,
nonmechanical way‖).
143. See id. at 315–16 (describing the law school‘s goal of achieving a critical mass of
diverse students to enrich education).
144. See id. at 335 (emphasizing that the law school did not maintain specified numbers
for minority enrollment).
145. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).

percentage or proportion established by the four-fifths rule that must be met
to avoid a prima facie case of disparate impact.147 In contrast, the critical
mass concept approved by the Grutter Court was not quantified by
numbers or percentages.148
Second, the disparate impact provision does not allow for ―a range
demarcated by the goal itself‖ like with critical mass.149 In an admissions
program, the number of students that are needed for a critical mass of
diverse students in the entering class can change from year to year.150 But
the proportion or percentage set by the four-fifths rule needed to satisfy the
disparate impact provision is fixed not only from year to year (unless the
EEOC passes new Guidelines), but also fixed for all employers.
Third, the disparate impact provision differs from critical mass because
critical mass affords consideration of race plus other factors. Although the
disparate impact provision considers other factors for ultimately
determining liability, race is the only consideration at the initial stage. A
plaintiff can show a prima facie case of disparate impact merely on race
alone. ―Unless and until the defendant [employer] pleads and proves a
business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated
elements‖ of disparate impact.151 If an employment practice fails the fourfifths rule, an employer must defend against a prima facie case of disparate
impact.152 Although the disparate impact provision affords employers the
defense of business necessity and job relatedness, it may be of limited
consolation because the costs associated with mounting the defense can be
prohibitive.153
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19.
149. Id. at 335 (quoting Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
150. Id. at 336.
151. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
152. Id.
153. To mount a defense, an employer would need to validate its selection criteria, at the
very least, which would require considerable expense of time and money. For example, in
Ricci, the city spent $100,000 to hire a testing consultant to develop and administer the
examinations. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009). One commentator has
remarked that ―[i]n theory, an employer can win an adverse impact case by proving that the
challenged selection criterion is valid. In practice, this burden can almost never be carried,
and the result is that employers are forced to hire and promote by quotas.‖ Gold, supra note
65, at 457.
For additional discussion of the expense and challenges of validation, see Booth &
Mackay, supra note 53; Gold, supra note 6565, at 460 n.82 (explaining that Daniel E.
Leach, vice-chair of EEOC in 1978, estimated criterion validation costing employers
$100,000–$400,000); Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 319 (1993) (noting that validation tests
are so exacting and demanding that smaller employers will often forgo the tests); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1235 (1995)
(―Formal validation of even relatively straightforward objective selection devices is an

Fourth, the disparate impact provision is distinguishable from critical
mass because it lacks a demonstrated need for the quota set by the
provision. In Grutter, the Court approved critical mass because the school
justified that a critical mass of diverse students was integral to the school‘s
educational mission.154 In contrast, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,155 (―Parents Involved‖) the school
board‘s failure to show a need for the sought-after level of diversity led to
the Court‘s conclusion that the board‘s student assignment was not
narrowly tailored.156 In that case, the school board used each school‘s
racial balance as one factor in placing students.157 If the school‘s racial
distribution was not within ten percentage points of the district‘s white to
non-white racial composition, then a student who would contribute to the
school‘s racial balance would be assigned to the school.158 The Court
explained, ―[t]he plans are tied to each district‘s specific racial
demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of
diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.‖159
Similarly, the disparate impact provision fails to demonstrate a need for
the level specified by the four-fifths rule. Researchers have criticized the
four-fifths rule as arbitrary.160 This ―arbitrariness‖ could be due to the fact
that the four-fifths or eighty percent rule resulted from two compromises:
(1) a desire expressed by those writing and having input into the
Guidelines to include a statistical test as the primary step but knowing
from an administrative point of view a statistical test was not possible for

expensive and time-consuming process, often requiring several years and hundreds of
thousands of dollars in professional fees and employee time.‖); Rutherglen, supra note 49,
at 1317–18 (explaining that validation tests are expensive, costing an estimate of $100,000
and must be completed each time a test is used for a different job); Andrew C. Spiropoulos,
Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding
the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1543 (1996) (―For example, the cost of the most
favored form of validation, criterion validation, has been estimated to be at least $100,000,
an expense that has to be incurred each time a practice is used for a particular job.‖); Van
Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 651 (―The burden of validation can be costly as well as
impossible in at least some cases.‖).
For a description of the types of validation, see Booth & Mackay, supra note 53, at 162–
65; Doreen Canton, Adverse Impact Analysis of Public Sector Employment Tests: Can a
City Devise a Valid Test?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 683, 691–96 (1987).
154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (―Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling
interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School‘s proper institutional mission, and that ‗good faith‘
on the part of the university is ‗presumed‘ absent ‗a showing to the contrary.‘‖ (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–19 (1978)).
155. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
156. Id. at 726.
157. Id. at 710.
158. Id. at 712.
159. Id. at 726.
160. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983).

the FEPC consultants who had to work the enforcement of the
Guidelines, and (2) a way to split the middle between two camps, the
161
70% camp and the 90% camp.

Consistent with Parents Involved, the EEOC would need to provide data
to support the chosen eighty percent over seventy percent, ninety percent,
or any other percentage and that the four-fifths rule is necessary to achieve
the goal envisioned by the disparate impact provision.162 Absent
supporting evidence for the four-fifths rule, it is, as the Court pointed out in
Sheet Metal Workers, ―completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of
each race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer . . .
absent unlawful discrimination.‖163
Additionally, even if the EEOC were to jettison the four-fifths rule or
another variation of the rule, the disparate impact could not operate
practically as a ―goal‖ like critical mass. The unique concerns of
uniformity of enforcement as well as giving notice to prospective plaintiffs
and defendants as to when liability may result for disparate impact make
the critical mass approach inapplicable to disparate impact. Critical mass is
an approach to using racial classifications that is unique to the educational
context.164
Critical mass has been used to describe three conditions:
[T]he existence of a precise minimum level of the required material for a
change to take place; a change that is sudden and transformative; and
that the change is not simply a function of a minimum level of the
resource but also a function of how elements of that resource interact
165
with one another.

In the educational context, the law school in Grutter used critical mass to
refer to ―meaningful numbers‖ or ―meaningful representation‖ needed to
encourage minority participation in the classroom without the sense of
isolation.166 In this regard, a university can practically operate an
161. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination,
84 IND. L.J. 773, 782 n.61 (quoting DAN BIDDLE, ADVERSE IMPACT AND TEST VALIDATION:
A
PRACTITIONER‘S
GUIDE
TO
VALID
AND
DEFENSIBLE
EMPLOYMENT
TESTING 3 (2005)).
162. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733
(2007) (plurality opinion) (noting the requirement of showing that a racial classification is
necessary to achieve a stated purpose).
163. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494
(1986) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (stating
that the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university admissions
program).
165. Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 97, 98–99 (2007).
166. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). The concept of critical mass
originated in science and refers to the precise minimum amount of mass needed to create
and sustain an explosion. Addis, supra note 165, at 98. Professor Addis points out that

admissions program without a defined number as to when critical mass is
achieved. It would be hard to imagine, however, how the EEOC could
enforce the disparate impact provision without a defined number or
percentage to serve as a point of reference in assessing when a
disproportionate adverse effect rises to the level of disparate impact. First,
the EEOC would need to establish a threshold to ensure that it uniformly
enforces the disparate impact provision and does not violate employers‘
equal protection rights by varying its application.167
Second, the EEOC would also need to be wary of due process claims for
assessing liability upon employers without giving them notice as to what
constitutes disparate impact. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted
to encompass procedural and substantive due process.168 Procedural due
process requires providing notice before a person‘s life, liberty, or property
can be taken away.169 An employer would not have adequate notice if it
did not have sufficient information to conform its behavior to the law.
Here, if the disparate impact provision operates without a defined
threshold, like critical mass, employers will not know what level of
disparity is actionable against them. Concomitantly, without a defined
threshold that would trigger disparate impact, prospective plaintiffs would
not know the appropriate circumstances under which to file a disparate
impact claim. Thus, even if the EEOC were to proceed without the fourfifths rule, it would be difficult for the disparate impact provision to be
enforced without some numerical or percentage threshold. Whatever the
form, any threshold is likely to operate as a quota because it draws a line on
the basis of race.170
IV. FLEXIBILITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED DECISION MAKING
A second factor in considering whether a program is narrowly tailored
includes the program‘s flexibility and individualized decision making. A
program‘s flexibility and individualized decision making are interrelated
with each other and the quota factor in that the characteristics relevant to

Grutter can be criticized for imprecisely and improperly using the concept of critical mass
because the scientific reference to critical mass is dependent upon ascertaining a precise
minimum amount, whereas the law school in Grutter, despite Justice Scalia‘s prodding,
declined to quantify critical mass. Id. at 125–26. Nonetheless, this section proceeds with an
analysis of critical mass as conceptualized by the law school, since its interpretation of
critical mass was accepted by the Court in Grutter.
167. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (―The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.‖).
168. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 2009).
169. Id.
170. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288–89.

the quota factor may also be relevant to the flexibility and individualized
decision making of the program.
A. Flexibility
In evaluating whether remedial race-conscious measures are narrowly
tailored, the Court has been concerned with the flexibility of the remedy.
In Paradise, the Court concluded that the one-for-one promotion quota was
flexible because the plan allowed for waiver in the absence of qualified
African American candidates.171 In Sheet Metal Workers, the membership
goal was narrowly tailored because the goal was flexible—the district court
twice extended the deadline and accommodated the union‘s economic
changes by adjusting the apprenticeship class size.172 The flexibility of the
Harvard admissions program countenanced by Bakke allowed for variation
in the weight accorded to a particular factor each year, as the mix of the
student body changed.173 Similarly, the flexibility of the program in
Grutter allowed for yearly fluctuation in the number of underrepresented
minority student enrollment.174
In contrast, the disparate impact provision does not appear to be flexible
like the goals in Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, Bakke, or Grutter. There
are no waivers or exceptions to the enforcement of the disparate impact
provision. Additionally, the disparate impact provision does not allow for
yearly variation based on an employer‘s need like the Harvard plan in
Bakke or the plan in Grutter.175 The ratio established by the four-fifths rule
remains constant in each case, regardless of whether an employer‘s needs
necessitate variation.
The constancy of the four-fifths rule is problematic for another reason.
The Court requires that for a race-conscious program to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement, the weight placed on race should be no more than is
necessary to achieve the compelling government interest.176 The four-fifths
rule places the same amount of weight on race regardless of the compelling
interest being asserted to justify the disparate impact provision‘s racial
classification. Whether the provision might be justified because it seeks to
obtain the benefits of diversity, provide role models, meet operational
needs, smoke out discrimination, or provide equal employment

171. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177 (1987).
172. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
487–88 (1986).
173. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18.
174. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003).
175. Id. at 336; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18.
176. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 523–24 (listing factors the Court has
considered relevant to narrow tailoring).

opportunities, the four-fifths rule is the only method allowed for achieving
the desired objective.
In Bakke177 and Grutter,178 the Court recognized the need for the
program to vary the weight placed on racial factors. Allowing for variation
ensures that the weight placed on race will be no more than necessary. The
four-fifths rule does not afford variation depending upon the asserted goal
or the employer‘s needs.
B. Individualized Decision Making
Individualized decision making is another factor relevant to determining
whether disparate impact meets the requirement of narrow tailoring.
Individualized decision making includes requiring preferences that are not
quantified,179 are differentiated,180 and are not excessive.181 In Bakke, the
Court was concerned by the medical school admissions program‘s sole
focus on ethnic diversity.182 The Court concluded that assigning a fixed
number of seats to minorities was not necessary183 because it was not the
only means to achieve diversity.184 In juxtaposition, the Bakke Court
discussed with approval the admissions program administered at Harvard
College.185
Although race or ethnicity may have operated as a ―plus‖ for an
applicant, race was not a decisive factor in Harvard‘s admissions
program.186 Instead, the Harvard policy included other qualities in
consideration of diversity and allowed the weight accorded to each factor to
vary each year, depending upon the attributes of the current student body
177. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18 (distinguishing the Harvard admissions program
from the medical school program in that the Harvard program allowed for ―the weight
attributed to a particular quality [to] vary from year to year depending upon the ‗mix‘ both
of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class‖).
178. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (―[T]he number of underrepresented minority students
who ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the
applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from year to year.‖). Commentators
have pointed out that in actuality the admissions program in Grutter placed greater
emphasis on race than the program in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Ayres &
Foster, supra note 23, at 538–39. Additionally, the use of race via the ―critical mass‖
approach had a greater impact on admissions than the point system used in Gratz. Id. at
535–36.
179. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 545 (clarifying that ―no quantified
preferences‖ means that the decision-making process does not have specified weights in a
formula for admission).
180. See id. at 547 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–73) (noting that the Supreme Court‘s
decision in Gratz implies that differentiation is required in a decision making process).
181. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court also attacked placing excessive emphasis on
any single characteristic in the decision making process).
182. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
183. Id. at 316.
184. Id. at 314–15.
185. Id. at 321–24.
186. Id. at 317.

and candidates for the incoming class.187 Thus, the Harvard program
employed race ―in a flexible, nonmechanical way‖ that permitted
individualized consideration of each applicant.188 The Bakke plurality
―developed the individualized consideration requirement in order to police
the distinction between an affirmative action program in which race was a
legitimate (but not predominant) element of difference, and an affirmative
action program that was sliding toward ‗the functional equivalent of a
quota system.‘‖189
In Grutter, the Court concluded that the law school‘s program was
narrowly tailored like the Harvard program because of its flexibility.190
The law school‘s program provided a ―highly individualized, holistic
review [for] each applicant‘s file,‖ regardless of race.191
In contrast to the Harvard program discussed in Bakke and the Grutter
program, the lack of individualized decision making was one factor that led
to the invalidation of the admissions program in the companion case Gratz
v. Bollinger.192 In Gratz, an undergraduate university employed a multifactored admissions system that included the following: ―the quality of an
applicant‘s high school (S), the strength of an applicant‘s high school
curriculum (C), an applicant‘s unusual circumstances (U), an applicant‘s
geographical residence (G), and an applicant‘s alumni relationship (A).‖193
In
addition
to these factors, the university considered an applicant‘s ―underrepresented
minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at a high school
with a predominantly underrepresented minority population, or
underrepresentation in the unit to which the student was applying.‖194 The
Court held that the University‘s program was not narrowly tailored because
the school automatically awarded twenty points to every underrepresented
minority, which amounted to one-fifth of the necessary points for
admission.195 Although the admissions program in Gratz used race as a
―plus‖ factor like the Harvard program and Grutter program, the automatic
distribution of twenty points did not allow for individualized decision
making.196
187. Id. at 317–18.
188. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
189. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68–69 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
190. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
191. Id. at 337.
192. 539 U.S. 244, 273–74 (2003).
193. Id. at 254.
194. Id. at 255.
195. Id. at 270.
196. Id. Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the college in Gratz applied a ―holistic
review‖ of its applicants like the law school in Grutter. Id. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Similarly, in Parents Involved, although the school district employed a
multi-tiered system of tiebreakers, the Court nonetheless concluded that
―under each plan when race comes into play, it [was] decisive by itself.‖197
Consequently, the school assignment policy was not narrowly tailored
because it employed racial factors in a mechanical, rather than
individualized manner.198
As seen in the above cases, in order for the disparate impact provision to
satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, it must provide individualized
consideration through case-by-case evaluation. Determining whether the
provision meets this requirement can be evaluated by framing the issue in
two ways. First, does the disparate impact provision force employers to
use racial classification in making employment decisions in a nonindividualized fashion? When framed this way, it appears that the
provision removes individualized decision making from employers because
of the four-fifths rule. Even if an employer were to evaluate each
candidate‘s application individually, an employer would create a prima
facie violation of the provision if a disparity of more than twenty percent
occurs between the selection rate of the most successful group and other
racial groups. Even though other factors are later considered in assessing
liability, race is the only factor in determining if there is a prima facie
violation. Like the impact of the automatic twenty point distribution in
Gratz and the multi-tiered tiebreaker system in Parents Involved, the fourfifths rule makes race a decisive factor for identifying prima facie
violations. Thus, the decisive role that race plays in implicating a prima
facie case of disparate impact supports Justice Scalia‘s criticism that ―the
disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly . . . since they fail to provide
an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct,
or perhaps even for good-faith plus hiring standards that are entirely
reasonable.‖199

The only difference was that in using the numbered scale, the college did not ―hide the ball.‖
Id. at 298; see also Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 519 (―If the government
decisionmaker does not ‗tell‘ courts how much of a racial preference it is giving[,] . . .
courts will essentially not ‗ask‘ probing questions about whether the preferences are
differentiated or excessive.‖); Post, supra note 189, at 74 (―[T]he value assigned to race is
camouflaged by an opaque process of implicit comparisons [in Grutter]. Although
transparency is ordinarily prized in the law, the Court in Grutter and Gratz constructs
doctrine that in effect demands obscurity.‖). Commentators have pointed out that the ―[l]aw
[s]chool may have been more formulaic than the [c]ollege,‖ but the Court ―took the law
school at its word its admissions program was nuanced.‖ Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at
549, 552.
197. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723
(2007) (plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 723.
199. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Another way to frame the issue is whether the provision allows for
individualized consideration by the courts in assessing disparate impact
liability. It is possible that the disparate impact provision satisfies the
requirement for individualized decision making because the provision
affords consideration of multiple factors in ultimately determining liability.
Before liability is finally assessed under the provision, a court reviews
whether an employer‘s business practice is a business necessity and job
related.200 Additionally, a court considers whether an employer refused to
use an equally effective alternative with less adverse effect.201
When framed in this way, the disparate impact provision avoids the
deficiency of Gratz. In Gratz, individualized decision making could take
place once a file was flagged, but the Court was unpersuaded by this
possibility because individual review occurred in exceptional cases, not as
a general rule.202 The disparate impact provision, however, provides
individual consideration of other factors in every case of prima facie
disparate impact to ultimately determine liability.203 In this regard, the
provision comports with Grutter and Bakke‘s conceptions of holistic,
individual review because race is not the decisive factor in the final
assessment of disparate impact liability.204 Thus, whether the disparate
impact provision affords individualized consideration to meet strict
scrutiny‘s narrowly tailored requirement depends upon whether the
provision is evaluated at the initial stage when a prima facie case of
disparate impact arises or at the final stage of determining liability when
defenses are considered.
V. SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM: OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE
A. The Court‘s Treatment of Underinclusive and Overinclusive Acts
For the disparate impact provision‘s use of racial classification to be
narrowly tailored, such classifications must not be underinclusive or
overinclusive. An underinclusive classification results when legislation
fails to encompass all similarly situated people in terms of the legislation‘s
objective; some people are included while others who are similarly situated
for purposes of the law are excluded.205 Overinclusiveness occurs when the
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
202. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 283–84 (2003).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
204. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (allowing race as a contributing
factor); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (holding
that a program that incorporates a ―plus‖ system for race but still compares all applicants
satisfies equal protection).
205. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746 (8th ed. 2010).

legislation overreaches in its inclusion of all persons similarly situated for
the purpose of the law and of persons whose inclusion is not relevant to the
law‘s objective.206
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term ―underinclusive‖ in its
analysis in Parents Involved, two concepts of underinclusiveness can be
construed from that case. First, underinclusive can mean failure to include
the persons who should be included for the purpose of the law.207 The
plurality in Parents Involved questioned the school districts‘ purported
interest in achieving diversity when the districts focused solely on ethnic
diversity, without considering the ―far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.‖208 In this regard, the focus on racial or ethnic origin
was underinclusive for the goal of achieving diversity.209 Moreover, with
respect to the consideration of racial diversity, the districts were
underinclusive by considering race exclusively in terms of white and nonwhite or black and ―other.‖210
A second concept of underinclusiveness entails the minimal impact or
effectiveness of the legislation at achieving its goal. In Parents Involved,
the Court pointed out that the racial tiebreaker ultimately shifted a small
number of students.211 The limited impact undermined the necessity of
using racial classification to achieve the asserted goal of racial integration
for socialization and education.212
Overinclusiveness is another factor that is detrimental to a raceconscious program. In Croson, the ―gross overinclusiveness‖ of the plan
undermined the argument that the plan was narrowly tailored.213 The Court
criticized the plan for its ―random inclusion‖ of racial groups that were not
victims of discrimination214 by allowing any qualified Minority Business
Enterprise to take advantage of the thirty percent set aside.215

206. Id.
207. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723
(2007) (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 722 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)) (internal
quotations omitted).
209. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (―To the extent the objective is sufficient
diversity[,] . . . using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is
fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.‖).
210. Id. at 703.
211. Id. at 733.
212. Id. at 734; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of RaceNeutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 285 (2009) (suggesting that limited impact
indicates existence of alternatives).
213. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989).
214. Id. at 506.
215. Id. at 478.

Similarly, in Bakke, the Court questioned the medical school‘s inclusion
of African Americans, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Asians
among the preferred groups for the sixteen seats set aside, noting that
Asians were already admitted in great numbers.216 This remark implied
that Asians did not need preferential treatment through the quota and that
the Court deemed admissions policy to be overinclusive because of their
inclusion.217
The impact of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness on satisfying
the narrowly tailored requirement is even more pronounced beyond the
context of racial classifications. In Citizens United v. FEC,218 the Court
invalidated a statute as violative of the First Amendment because the
statute prohibited independent corporate expenditures advocating a
candidate‘s election or defeat.219 The purpose of the statute was to protect
shareholders from being compelled to finance corporate political speech,
but the statute was considered both underinclusive and overinclusive.220 As
to underinclusiveness, the statute only prohibited speech in certain media
and within a certain time frame, even though a shareholder‘s interest would
be affected regardless of the type of media or time.221 Overinclusiveness
resulted from the statute‘s inclusion of all corporations, including nonprofit
and single-shareholder for-profit corporations.222
In Carey v. Brown,223 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited
picketing of residences or dwellings but allowed peaceful labor
picketing.224 The state enacted the statute for the purposes of protecting the
peace and privacy of residents from nonlabor picketing,225 but the Court
concluded that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.226 The
statute was both overinclusive and underinclusive because it permitted
peaceful labor picketing without regard to the disturbances that would
result while it broadly banned nonlabor picketing without distinguishing
among
the
harms
227
to residential privacy.
Therefore, the cases demonstrate
that overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness undermines the
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reasonableness of a program‘s scope and its satisfaction of the narrowly
tailored requirement.
B. Overinclusive and Underinclusive Due to Probability for Error
When the disparate impact provision is evaluated for overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness to determine narrow tailoring, one may find the
provision‘s scope to be problematic. The disparate impact provision is not
narrowly tailored because it may be overinclusive or underinclusive as a
result of its probability for error. If the provision is overinclusive or
underinclusive, its racial classifications are unnecessary and alternatives are
likely available.
A program may be overinclusive and/or underinclusive if it is not
accurate. Studies show that the probability of error with applying the fourfifths rule is high.228 Researchers have identified three problems arising
from the four-fifths rule:
(1) there is a high probability that an employer will be found to be
discriminating under the four-fifths rule, when in fact, he is not
discriminating; (2) there is a high probability that an employer will be
held harmless due to compliance with the four-fifths rule when, in fact,
he is discriminating against a group of employees; and (3) the four-fifths
rule and statistical significance criterion indicate discrimination in quite
229
different situations.

In one study, Professor Anthony Boardman determined the probability of
making Type I errors (false positives) and Type II errors (false
negatives).230 Professor Boardman calculated the outcomes in situations
involving two groups and in situations with more than two groups.231 He
found that the probability for error in claiming an adverse impact when
none existed (Type I error) was greater than fifty percent when there were
two groups with fewer than twenty-five people.232 For situations involving

228. Anthony E. Boardman, Another Analysis of the EEOC ―Four-Fifths‖ Rule, 25
MGMT. SCI. 770, 776 (1979).
229. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983). But see
Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169 (―The 80% rule appears to be a reasonable articulation of
a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant differences are substantial
enough to warrant legal liability.‖).
230. Boardman, supra note 228, at 770 (using a model that assumed that the number of
people promoted is predetermined).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 776. Professor Boardman provides detailed explanation of his model and
formulas, but there is no explanation for what may account for Type I and Type II errors, or
why the percentages for these errors are so high.

more than two groups, the probabilities for Type I errors were higher.233
The chances that people who were adversely impacted but failed to claim
adverse impact (Type II errors) were higher than forty percent, regardless
of whether there were two or three groups.234
As Professor Boardman concluded, ―the EEOC‘s rule appears to invite
considerable inappropriate litigation‖ while ―fail[ing] to clearly indicate
discrimination when discrimination exists.‖235 Although it is not clear
whether a fifty percent likelihood of a Type I error by a prospective
claimant will necessarily equate to a fifty percent likelihood of enforcement
by the EEOC and private parties,236 an over-filing of adverse impact claims
increases the chances that these mistaken claims will lead to erroneous
over-enforcement of the disparate impact provision and erroneous
assessment of liability.
The implication of Type II errors is clearer. Assuming that the bulk of
disparate impact litigation result from claimants filing charges with the
EEOC (as opposed to the EEOC initiating charges),237 if there is a forty
percent likelihood that potential claimants are failing to file adverse impact
233. Id.; see also Irwin Greenberg, An Analysis of the EEOC ―Four-Fifths‖ Rule,
25 MGMT. SCI. 762, 765 (1979) (―As the number of groups increases, the chance of making
a type I error increases.‖).
234. Boardman, supra note 228, at 776.
235. Id.; see also Richard M. Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 55 INDUS. REL. L. J. 493, 493 n.3 (1979) (concluding that the fourfifths rule ―can lead either to the false charge of adverse impact or to the conclusion that no
adverse impact exists when, in fact, the employer‘s selection procedure is discriminatory‖);
Greenberg, supra note 233, at 766 (―[I]t is clear that the four-fifths rule is not well-suited to
achieve equal employment opportunities.‖).
236. An unlawful employment complaint begins with a written charged filed by a
complainant under oath. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). The Commission determines, after
an investigation, whether it has a reasonable cause to believe the charges are true. After
such a determination, the Commission may pursue the charges by ―informal methods of
conference,
conciliation,
and
persuasion.‖
Id.
If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance within a set time, the
complainant or, under certain circumstances, another alleged to be aggrieved, or the EEOC
may file a civil action. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, although the Commission is responsible
for reviewing every charge, the Commission may not pursue every charge beyond the
investigation phase. The right-to-sue letter imposes a condition precedent for private parties
filing a Title VII claim in federal court. Roy L. Brooks, Beyond Civil Rights Restoration
Legislation: Restructuring Title VII, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 551, 557 (1989).
For example, in 2010, the Commission received 35,890 charges alleging race-based
discrimination. Of those charges filed, the Commission determined ―no reasonable cause‖
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(3.5%). The statistics provided by the EEOC do not distinguish between disparate treatment
charges
and
disparate
impact
charges.
See
Race-Based
Charges:
FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm, (last visited February 14, 2011)
(compiling data on race-based discrimination).
237. A member of the EEOC may file a charge when the member believes an unlawful
employment practice exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)(2006); see also BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1626, 1659–62 (C.
Geoffrey Weirich et al., eds, 4th ed. 2007)(discussing a commissioner‘s charge).

charges, it is reasonable to conclude that this percentage strongly correlates
to the percentage of under-enforcement by the EEOC and private parties.
Thus, Professor Boardman‘s study reveals the immense likelihood that the
four-fifths rule will be overinclusive, casting its enforcement net so widely
that it captures employers who are not in fact causing an adverse impact.238
His study also supports an inference that the four-fifths rule is
underinclusive, failing to capture the employers who are in fact causing an
adverse impact.239
Numerous studies have yielded similar results.240 For example,
Professors Marion Gross Sobol and Charles Ellard concluded that in some
circumstances ―the four-fifths rule signals discrimination when in fact there
is none; the four-fifths rule seems to exaggerate true adverse impact.‖241
They also found that in other situations, however, ―[t]he four-fifths rule,
instead of exaggerating discrimination with large . . . numbers, is not
sensitive enough to the discriminatory situation. Thus, under the four-fifths
rule, Type II error is committed.‖242
Although a majority of the studies on the four-fifths rule were conducted
on the heels of the EEOC‘s promulgation of the rule in 1978, recent studies
also confirm the fallibility of the rule. In one study, researchers conducted
a statistical survey of the data in Ricci and concluded that a fair, nondiscriminatory test for either the lieutenant or captain position would fail
the four-fifths rule nearly seventy percent of the time.243 Additionally, fair
tests for both positions would fail the four-fifths rule at least sixty percent
of the time.244 Researchers using the 0.05 significance level245 found that

238. See Boardman, supra note 228, at 776 (concluding that this fraction system presents
a double bind: any change to avoid finding discrimination in innocent employers risks
failing to uncover real discrimination).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35.
240. See generally Louis J. Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its
Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 80–81 (1980) (―This rule can easily
lead to inaccurate results.‖); Cohn, supra note 235 (arguing that reliance on quantitative data
can mislead employment discrimination litigants); Greenberg, supra note 233 (showing that
the four-fifths rule fails due to both types of errors); Meier et al., supra note 63 (comparing
two statistical tests and finding the four-fifths rule more helpful for determining substantial
discrimination); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48 (finding that, depending on the particular
values used, the four-fifths rule can lead to both types of errors); Van Bowen & Riggins,
supra note 45 (testing the four-fifths methodology for uniformity across employers and
finding it lacking).
241. Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 395.
242. Id. at 396.
243. Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in
Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences Than the U.S. Government‘s ‗FourFifths‘ Rule: An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L.,
PROBABILITY & RISK 171, 171 (2009).
244. Id.
245. Levels of significance are evidentiary mechanisms of disproving a hypothesis. R.A.
Fisher, responsible for developing the concept of ―level of significance,‖ regarded

despite the lower courts‘ conclusions that both the lieutenant and captain
examinations in Ricci had a disparate impact, only one of the tests had
differences in pass rates that were statistically significant.246 The research
concluded that differences in pass rates on the lieutenant examination were
statistically significant, whereas the pass rate differences on the captain
examination ―were not close to statistical significance.‖247
What accounts for the high probability of Type I and II errors in these
studies has not been explained, but perhaps the probability of errors is
related to the four-fifths rule as a threshold for proving disparate impact.
The four-fifths rule may be overinclusive and underinclusive depending on
the size of the employer.248 For example, ―a small employer with a small
absolute disparity between male and female applicants might face liability
under the rule, while a large employer can have a much greater disparity
and still comply with the four-fifths rule.‖249
Sample size (the size of the employer, i.e., the number of employees in a
business) also affects statistical significance tests.250 ―[T]he smaller the
sample size, the larger the disparity in rates can be without reaching

any test of significance that results in a larger than 5% significance level (i.e., less
than 1.96 standard errors) as unpersuasive, a difference with significance level
between 5% and 2% (i.e., between 1.96 and 2.33 standard errors) as credible, and a
difference with significance level more extreme than 2% (i.e., greater than 2.33
standard errors) as clearly indicative of a real, underlying difference.
Meier et al., supra note 63 63, at 151. An event found to be significant at the 2% level
means a smaller probability that the event resulted from randomness as compared with a 5%
level of significance. Id.
Researchers generally use a five percent (0.05) level of significance, which is also known
as the ninety-five percent confidence level. See Peresie, supra note 161, at 785; Elaine W.
Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof
under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 800 (1978) (―Statisticians often adopt a 5% rule of
thumb, rejecting the null hypothesis if the probability of obtaining the sample pass rate
difference by chance is less than 5%.‖); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 651
(―Statisticians use the five percent figure most often and refer to it as the ninety-five percent
level of significance.‖). But see Meier et al., supra note 63, at 151 n.46 (citing William H.
Kruskal,
Significance,
Tests
of,
in
2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS 944 (William H. Kruskal & Judith A.
Tanur, eds., 1978) (―[T]here is no professional consensus about the proper use of
significance levels, or about which level of significance is critical, to claim the law‘s
particular attention.‖). The five percent level of significance has also ―been accepted in
many legal decisions.‖ Gatswirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 176; Scott W. McKinley,
Comment, The Need for Legislative or Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How
Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171,
197–98 (2008) (discussing the .05 and .01 confidence levels as ―cited with approval by
courts as a proper method of measuring statistical significance‖ (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted)).
246. Gastwirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 173.
247. Id.
248. Peresie, supra note 161, at 784.
249. Id.
250. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 155.

statistical significance.‖251 When the sample size is small, there is a greater
likelihood of false negatives, indicating the absence of discrimination,
when, in fact, it exists.252 On the other hand, the larger the sample size, the
more it will amplify any difference.253 Therefore, ―whereas the four-fifths
rule could be said to itself have a disparate impact on small employers, the
statistical significance rule could be said to have a disparate impact on
large employers because even a small disparity may achieve statistical
significance.‖254
As a result of the effect of sample size, the disparate impact provision
allows courts to choose sides merely by the measure of disparity
selected.255 A small employer has a greater risk of liability under the fourfifths rule than under a statistical significance test, while a large employer
251. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206
(―When samples are very small, large differentials are necessary to obtain statistically
significant results.‖).
252. Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206.
253. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 160 (―[L]arge sample sizes will tend to make any
difference statistically significant.‖). Researchers caution that one possible consequence of
the effect of sample size on statistical significance tests is the pressure to resort to quotas.
Id. at 161. Professors Meier, Sacks, and Zabell explain that businesses employing large
numbers inevitably will be liable for disparate impact against a group. Id. Such businesses
will be faced with the choice of expending thousands to validate their selection criteria or
avoid the costs of validation by opting to use quotas, rather than the selection criteria. Id.
(citing Barbara Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality in
Employment
Testing,
1976
SUP. CT. REV. 263). For additional discussion about the expense of time and money
necessary for validation tests, see supra note 152.
The Court has been sensitive to the potential for disparate impact to lead employers to
adopt quotas: ―We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt prophylactic measures.‖ Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality opinion). The Watson Court
opined, ―If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of
avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be
widely adopted.‖ Id. at 993. Ricci reiterated a similar concern: The ―focus on statistics
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.‖
Ricci
v.
DeStefano,
129
S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992) (internal quotations omitted).
But see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996) (arguing that
the disparate impact provision does not induce quotas).
254. Peresie, supra note 161, at 787; see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at
216 (―When few individuals are selected the probability that the protected group might
claim adverse impact is much higher under the four-fifths rule than under the statistical
significance rules. When 200 people are selected, the rules are identical, while for larger
selections the statistical significance rules are more stringent for the employer than is the
four-fifths rule.‖); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 393 n.40 (1988) (―For very small
sample sizes both the 4/5ths rule and a binomial test, based upon approximation to the
normal distribution, are inadequate measures of discrimination. In the case of the 4/5ths
rule, the effect of hiring or failing to hire just one person has a grossly disproportionate
effect on the determination of discrimination.‖); Shoben, supra note 245, at 809 (describing
the importance of sample size in determining whether a discrepancy in pass rates is
significant).
255. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789.

faces the opposite risk. On the other hand, a small sample size causes
defendants to favor statistical significance and plaintiffs to favor the fourfifths rule—but as the sample size increases, that preference switches.256
Applying these results, if a court is pro-defendant, ―it will prefer the fourfifths rule where the selection rates at issue are high (because a significant
disparity will not be actionable), but not where the selection rates are
low.‖257 Thus, whether disparate impact is measured by statistical
significance tests or the four-fifths rule, the disparate impact provision is
prone to be overinclusive and underinclusive.
Another related problem with the four-fifths rule is that it does not assist
courts in assessing causation. 258 Instead, the rule creates a ―high threshold
(the four-fifths ratio) necessary to establish a disparate impact in order to
provide for the possibility that other factors are causing the disparity. But
this at most indirectly evaluates causation and results in a significant false
negatives problem.‖259 This criticism affects the efficacy of the disparate
impact provision in achieving its purpose. As seen in Parents Involved, the
limited impact the provision has on attaining its asserted goal undermines
its ability to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.260
If the disparate impact provision, however, takes into consideration
sample size and statistical significance, it might avoid the criticism of being
underinclusive or overinclusive and not causally relevant. As some
researchers suggest, ―[t]he 80% rule appears to be a reasonable articulation
of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant
differences are substantial enough to warrant legal liability.‖261 The fourfifths rule appears to allow for the effect of sample size by ―incorporating a
measure of practical significance.‖262 If researchers Boardman, Vining,
256. Id.; see also Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 398 (―The error of the four-fifths rule
also increases as the size of the hiring population increases. For small numbers of hires the
four-fifths criterion is actually more demanding on the employer than the binomial test. For
large numbers of hires the binomial test is more demanding on the employer. Thus, in
comparison to the binomial test, the four-fifths rule will be more likely to find
discrimination where it does not exist (Type I error) for a small firm, and less likely to find
discrimination where it does exist (Type II error) for a large firm.‖); Van Bowen & Riggins,
supra note 45, at 650 (―[T]he four-fifths or eighty per cent rule is not statistically valid and
should not be used because it does not apply consistently to all employers. . . . The eighty
percent rule produces different results depending on variables in the percentage of
minorities in the relevant labor pool and in the number of selections made.‖).
257. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789.
258. Id. at 791.
259. Id. at 791.
260. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (explaining the failed policy of using racial classifications to determine
school assignments for minority students).
261. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169.
262. Id. at 168. The four-fifths rule provides as follows:
Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact,
where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or where a user‘s

Sobol, Ellard, and others took the four-fifths rule‘s allowance for sample
size into account and if their results are unaffected, then their conclusions
concerning the disparate impact provision‘s potential for false positive and
false negative errors might still show that the provision is vulnerable to
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. If, however, the four-fifths
rule‘s allowance for sample size was not considered, it might affect the
results of the researchers‘ conclusions about false positive and false
negative errors, and consequently the determination of the reasonableness
of the disparate impact provision‘s scope. Thus, whether the provision is
narrowly tailored in this regard is unsettled.
C. Exclusion of White Males Would Lead to Underinclusiveness
The purpose of the disparate impact provision may be frustrated if it
excludes individuals of a certain racial group from alleging discrimination
based on race, despite their historical safety from discrimination. For
example, the disparate impact provision may be underinclusive if it
excludes white males from making disparate impact claims.263 No
definitive answer to the question of whether the provision allows for claims
by white males can be found among the Supreme Court cases involving
disparate impact because there have not been any white male plaintiffs.264
Additionally, there is no consensus among commentators.265

actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or
ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate may not constitute adverse
impact where the differences are based on small numbers and are not statistically
significant, or where special recruiting or other programs cause the pool of
minority or female candidates to be atypical of the normal pool of applicants from
that group. Where the user‘s evidence concerning the impact of a selection
procedure indicates adverse impact but is based upon numbers which are too small
to be reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a longer period
of time and/or evidence concerning the impact which the selection procedure had
when used in the same manner in similar circumstances elsewhere may be
considered in determining adverse impact.
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010).
263. Interestingly, veterans‘ preference is one of the few, if not the only, neutral
selection device that affords African Americans an advantage over whites.
See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 368 n.310 (citing Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff‘d in part, rev‘d in part sub nom., Smith v. Troyan, 520
F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975)). In Smith, only thirty-six percent of the white applicants were
veterans and entitled to a veterans‘ preference compared with the seventy-five percent of
African American applicants who were veterans and also given the preference. 363 F.
Supp. at 1146. The plaintiffs, however, consisted of African Americans and females. Id. at
1133.
264. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down?: Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2004).
Although Ricci is a Supreme Court case that involved disparate impact, Ricci does not
provide an answer as to whether the provision protects white males because the white male
plaintiffs challenged the city‘s action under the disparate treatment provision and the Equal
Protection Clause. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). The disparate impact

The arguments against applying the disparate impact provision in favor
of white males center on the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1991.266 Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers suggest that the
original intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to protect minorities
only: ―Title VII was designed ‗to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.‘‖267
Additionally, United Steelworks v. Weber268 can be interpreted as
supporting a limitation against extending the disparate impact provision to
issue in Ricci related to whether the city had ―a strong basis in evidence‖ to believe that
African American firefighters had a disparate impact claim. Id. at 2681.
While the Supreme Court has yet to address a case involving white males filing disparate
impact claims, several lower courts have confronted this issue. See, e.g., Barnhill v.
Chicago Police Department, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (suit by white-male
plaintiffs against police department alleging that an examination had a discriminatory
impact on Caucasians in contravention of Title VII); Foss v. Thompson, 242 F.3d 1131,
1134 (9th Cir. 2001)(allegation by white male that the employer‘s requirement that
applicants have a nursing degree caused a disparate impact on the basis of sex); Zottola v.
City of Oakland, 32 F. App‘x 307, 309 (9th Cir. 2002)(involving a claim that the city‘s use
of oral interviews as part of an examination for hiring firefighters had a disparate impact on
white males); Sims v. Montgomery County Sheriff‘s Department, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1485–
86 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (claim by white male deputy intervenors that inadequate notice of a
deadline caused a disparate impact on white males but the court found the claim lacked
merit); Johnson v. Holley, Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031, 2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 4, 2008)(court recognizing plaintiffs‘ argument that a police department
promotional examination had a disparate impact on white males).
These cases do not directly hold that white males are covered by the disparate impact
provision. By allowing claims by white males to proceed and addressing the merits of their
disparate impact claim, however, the courts recognized implicitly that white males fall
within the protection of the provision. In all of these cases, none of the defendants argued
that the disparate impact provision was unavailable to white males, nor did the courts
hesitate to conduct its analysis on the merits of the disparate impact claim for want of proper
plaintiffs. The courts did not dismiss the cases because the plaintiffs were white males and
ineligible to assert disparate impact claim by virtue of race and sex, but rather the courts
disposed of these cases for lack of evidence showing a prima facie case of disparate impact.
These cases are evidence that white males may proceed under the disparate impact theory if
sufficient evidence exists.
265. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1524. For arguments
that disparate impact claims are unavailable to white males, see Chamallas, supra note 88, at
366–68; Kate L. Didech, Note, The Extension of Disparate Impact Theory to White Men:
What
the
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1991
Plainly
Does
not
Mean,
10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 55, 74–75 (2004) For arguments favoring inclusion of white males,
see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
523, 558 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1512; Michael L. Zimmer, Individual
Disparate Impact Law:
On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 501–02 (1999).
266. See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 367 (arguing that Congress ―was concerned with
improving the economic status of blacks‖); Didech, supra note 265, at 74 (arguing that
extending disparate impact theory to white men is ―not within the statute‘s spirit and the
intention of its makers‖); John J. Donahue III, Comment, Understanding the Reasons for
and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897,
898 (2001).
267. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int‘l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448
(1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–03 (1971)).
268. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

protect white males.269 In Weber, the Court concluded that ―Congress‘
primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‗the plight of the Negro
in our economy.‘‖270 The Weber Court decided that ―it was clear to
Congress that ‗[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally
closed to them,‘ and it was to this problem that Title VII‘s prohibition
against racial discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.‖271
Finally, the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could
support a similar interpretation. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991
adopted the definitions of business necessity and job relatedness from
Griggs,272 it codified the theory of disparate impact along with the Court‘s
interpreted limitations.273
There are, however, problems with the theory that white males cannot
avail themselves of the disparate impact provision. While the language of
Griggs suggests a limitation against white males, McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.,274 Bakke, and Teal support allowing disparate
impact claims by white males.
McDonald involved a claim of
discrimination by a white male who was discharged by his employer and
addressed whether Title VII covered intentional discrimination against
white employees.275 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court,
declared:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of ―any
individual‖ because of ―such individual‘s race.‖ Its terms are not limited
to discrimination against members of any particular race. . . . This
conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the
effect that Title VII was intended to ―cover white men and white women
and all Americans‖ and create an ―obligation not to discriminate against
whites.‖
We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson
276
white.

269. Id. at 199, 209 (permitting under Title VII an affirmative action plan bargained by
the union and employer that reserved fifty percent of the openings in a training program for
African American employees).
270. Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. S6548 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of
Rep. Humphrey)).
271. Id. at 203 (alterations original) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (statement of
Rep. Humphrey)).
272. See 137 Cong. Rec. 30630, 30662 (1991) (stating that codifying Griggs was one of
the purposes of § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
273. Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1534.
274. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
275. Id. at 278–80.
276. Id. at 278–80 (internal citations omitted).

Although McDonald did not raise a disparate impact claim, the Court‘s
holding suggests that Title VII is universally available.
Bakke also buttresses an inclusive interpretation of the disparate impact
provision to encompass white males. In Bakke, the medical school argued
that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny because the plaintiff, a white
male, is not among a ―discrete and insular minority‖ group that is afforded
heightened protection.277 The Court unequivocally declared that ―[r]acial
and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination
without regard to these additional characteristics.‖278 The Court explained,
―[a]lthough many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived
of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of
the Negro race and the white ‗majority,‘ the Amendment itself was framed
in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of
prior servitude.‖279
Similarly, although Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
1991 with the vision of bringing equality to African Americans,280 the
disparate impact provision, too, was framed in universal terms. As Bakke
demonstrated, the universal language of an act prevails over Congressional
intent.281 Therefore, because the disparate impact provision was written in
universal terms, the provision also affords white males protection.
Additionally, Teal‘s individual-centered approach also supports an
expansive interpretation of the disparate impact provision. In Teal, the
plaintiffs filed a disparate impact claim because an employment test that
was required for promotion had an adverse effect on African Americans.282
The employer asserted a ―bottom-line‖ theory of defense, arguing that the
employer should not be liable for disparate impact caused by the test if the
bottom-line outcome of the promotional process achieved racial balance.283
Teal rejected the bottom-line defense because Title VII‘s principle of
equality centered on the individual, not groups.284 The Court concluded,
―Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out
‗artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary‘ employer-created barriers to
professional development that have a discriminatory impact upon
individuals.‖285 If, as interpreted by Teal, the disparate impact provision‘s
277. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
278. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
279. Id. at 293 (internal citation omitted).
280. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 84–87.
281. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 337–38 (explaining that the broad language of the statute
reflects the legislature‘s intent for judicial determination of the statute‘s applicability).
282. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1982).
283. Id. at 442.
284. See id. at 451 (describing Title VII‘s purpose of eliminating employment barriers
that bar individuals from advancing).
285. Id. (emphasis added).

purpose is to protect individuals, not groups, then the provision should not
exclude an entire class of individuals—white males.286
Arguably, Teal‘s individual-centered approach can be construed to
restrict white males from asserting a disparate impact claim. It is possible
that while Teal interpreted Title VII as securing protection for
individuals,287 it intended to address only minorities. In Teal, the Court
stated, ―[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at
the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these individual
respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the
basis of job-related criteria.‖288 Teal‘s reference to ―white workers‖ may
have the same limiting effect as Griggs‘s reference to ―white employees‖289
as previously discussed.290
But this argument may be less persuasive in light of the context of Teal
and Griggs. It is important to recognize that Teal and the other Supreme
Court cases containing language that suggests the unavailability of
disparate impact claims for white males all involved minority and female
plaintiffs.291 Also, although Weber and Sheet Metal Workers involved
white plaintiffs, they did not directly assert a disparate impact claim.292
Ultimately, even if the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
and 1991 did not extend protection to white males, precluding white males
from asserting a disparate impact claim would raise an obvious equal
protection challenge. Such a restrictive interpretation of the disparate
impact provision would be contrary to our current notions of what is
emblematic of the Equal Protection Clause.293 The exclusion of white
males from the protection of the provision would, in and of itself, involve a
classification resulting in unequal application of the provision, which
would trigger strict scrutiny and require a compelling interest to justify this
exclusion.

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
290. See supra text accompanying note 267.
291. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989) (female
candidate refused partnership position in firm); Teal, 457 U.S. at 442–43 (black employees
allege discrimination on promotion examination); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426–27 (black
employees sue for discriminatory employment practices).
292. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n, 478 U.S. 421, 426 (1986)
(determining whether a court can compel relief from discrimination that may benefit
individuals who have not been subjected to historical discrimination); United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–01 (1979) (determining the validity of a negotiated affirmative
action plan in the hiring policy).
293. See Primus, supra note 22, at 496 (explaining the modern notion of equal protection
as hostile towards government action that seeks to redress historical discrimination).

Additionally, regardless of the asserted compelling interest, for example,
smoking out discrimination, providing role models, attaining the benefits of
diversity, meeting operational needs, or removing barriers to equal
employment opportunities,294 excluding white males from asserting a
disparate impact claim would render the provision underinclusive in
meeting any one of these interests. For example, if the disparate impact
provision‘s racial classification was intended to attain the benefits of
diversity, excluding white males from the provision‘s coverage would
hamper the furtherance of fostering cross-racial understanding and problem
solving.295 Consider another example. If the compelling interest
underlying the provision‘s racial classification rested on removing barriers
to equal employment opportunities, that goal would be more effectively
achieved if it allowed white males to sue for disparate impact.
In light of the potential Equal Protection Clause violation that a
restrictive interpretation of the disparate impact provision would raise, the
rules of statutory construction would necessitate that white males be
included. The Court has operated under the principle that it will construe a
statute in a manner that avoids declaring an act invalid if it is fairly possible
to do so.296 Reliance on the plain language of the statute provides an
expansive interpretation of the provision and would allow the Court to
fairly avoid invalidating the provision for failing to include white males.
VI. DURATION
For the disparate impact provision to pass strict scrutiny, it must also be
narrowly tailored in duration.297 Duration is a critical factor in evaluating
whether a program is narrowly tailored because the Court has established
that ―all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.‖298 As the
Court has explained, ―[t]his requirement reflects that racial classifications,
however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may
be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a

294. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing possible compelling interests that may
justify the disparate impact provision‘s racial classification under an Equal Protection
Clause challenge).
295. See id. at 49–52 (discussing asserted benefits of diversity).
296. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (―When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.‖).
297. A normative discussion of whether affirmative action programs should have
durational limits is beyond the scope of this article.
298. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). For example, the Court was
reluctant to permit affirmative action programs that had ―no logical stopping point‖ in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion).

permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this
fundamental equal protection principle.‖299
A durational requirement has been applied in remedial programs in order
to ensure that a program intended to remedy past discrimination is not
being used simply to achieve and maintain racial balance.300 In Croson, the
Court required findings not only to support a remedial need but also ―to
assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all
racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the
service of the goal of equality itself.‖301 Therefore, although the Court
ultimately held that the city lacked a remedial purpose, it envisioned
remedial programs as temporary devices.302
Additionally, Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers support requiring a
durational limit for race-conscious programs, as evidenced by the Court‘s
conclusions that the challenged programs were narrowly tailored because
they were temporary.303 The Court described the membership goal in Sheet
Metal Workers as a ―temporary measure[]‖ that would end when the
percentage of minorities in the local work force was reflected in the
percentage of minorities in the union.304 The Court concluded that the
membership goal ―operate[d] as a temporary tool for remedying past
discrimination without attempting to maintain a previously achieved
balance.‖305

299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. In his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice
Powell wrote that the ―temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious
program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.‖ 448
U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
300. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475
(1986) (explaining that though a court has discretion to fashion appropriate remedies for
Title VII violations, a court ―should exercise its discretion with an eye towards Congress‘
concern that race-conscious affirmative measures not be invoked simply to create a racially
balanced work force‖). Some courts have dissolved remedial plans that have lasted for
thirty years. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 764 (2006) (describing the Boston police and fire department‘s use of remedial
hiring plans and their dissolution by the district court after their existence for more than
thirty years). These plans were instituted pursuant to consent decrees, which were relied on
even after the remedial goals specified in the decrees had been accomplished. Id. Other
courts, however, have allowed remedial plans to continue after having lasted well over thirty
years. In Cotter v. City of Boston, the court found that discrimination existed as early as
1972. 323 F.3d 160, 169 (2003). When the city‘s remedial plan was challenged, the court
was persuaded that ―remedying past discrimination takes time‖ and decided that ―[w]hile the
numbers are more representative today, [the court was] not prepared to rule that all effects
of past discrimination have been eliminated.‖ Id.
301. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality opinion).
302. Id.
303. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987) (plurality opinion); Sheet Metal
Workers, 478 U.S. at 479.
304. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
305. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Likewise, the Court determined that the quota in Paradise was
―ephemeral‖ because ―the term of its application [was] contingent upon the
Department‘s own conduct,‖306 and explained that the fifty percent quota
was ―not itself the goal; rather it represent[ed] the speed at which the goal
of 25% [would] be achieved.‖307 The Court analogized the goal in
Paradise to the end date imposed in Sheet Metal Workers: ―In these
circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of 50% minority
promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet Metal Workers, was crafted
and applied flexibly, was constitutionally permissible.‖308
In circumstances where the compelling interest is something other than
remedial, the Court has been equally insistent on time limits. Grutter is
one example. Because the race-conscious program in Grutter was upheld
on a compelling interest of achieving diversity and attaining its benefits,
rather than on remedial grounds, one would not expect a durational limit on
diversity.309 On the other hand, one might expect a time limit for remedial
programs because once the discrimination has been remedied, assuming
that it can be reliably and readily ascertained, the program may no longer
be necessary. Remedial programs seek to redress a ―particular quantum of
harm‖ with ―clearer, more finite endpoints.‖310
Setting a durational limit on diversity, however, may be incongruous
because it would amount to setting an ―expiration date‖ on diversity.311
Diversity is not temporal by nature.312 As Professor Robert Post explains,

306. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178.
307. Id. at 179.
308. Id. at 180.
309. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338, 343 (2003) (extolling the virtues of a
―broad range of qualities‖ outside of solely race as ―valuable contributions‖ to the
compelling interest of ―student body diversity‖).
310. See Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need
Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1101 (2004)
(reporting that the durational limit inherent in remedial programs is attractive to a judiciary
that does not want to ―endorse open-ended schemes‖).
311. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) (arguing that the Court‘s twenty-five-year sunset
provision on affirmative action programs does not make sense when applied to student
diversity as the compelling interest because ―universities could still want to strive for a
racially diverse student body even if an institution‘s past discriminatory history has been
fully addressed‖).
312. See Johnson, supra note 311, at 183 (―[T]ime limits are normally associated with
affirmative action programs designed to remedy past discrimination, not those aimed at
ensuring a diverse student body.‖); Post, supra note 189, at 67–68 n.306 (―[T]he
justification of diversity, unlike remedy, has no built-in time horizon; if diversity is
necessary for the quality of education, it is necessary at any and all times.‖); Christopher J.
Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter‘s Expectation that Race-Conscious
Admissions
Programs
Will
End
in
Twenty-Five
Years,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 753, 761 (2004) (describing the Court‘s holding in Grutter ―abrupt‖
and ―puzzling‖ because a ―time limitation requirement contradicts its conclusion that
diversity is a compelling state interest since diversity is a non-time sensitive interest‖).

―[i]f diversity is necessary in order to train competent professionals, for
example, it is necessary at any and all times; there is no intrinsic time
horizon when this need for diversity will disappear.‖313
Nonetheless, the Grutter Court refused to exempt the admissions
program from durational limits,314 which the Court contemplated could be
satisfied by sunset provisions and periodic reviews of the program to assess
its necessity.315 Consequently, Justice O‘Connor anticipated the following:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of higher
education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the [diversity]
316
interest . . . .

In light of the above cases, regardless of the type of compelling interest
that might justify the disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications, the
provision must have a durational limit. Arguably, the provision‘s fourfifths rule can be construed as an end date like the twenty-five percent goal
in Paradise and twenty-nine percent goal in Sheet Metal Workers.317
Under this argument, the four-fifths rule sets the pace at which the goal will
be met.
One notable difference, however, is that enforcement of the goals in
Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers ceased once the remedial goals were
achieved, thereby ensuring the goals‘ temporary status.318 In contrast, even
if the disparate impact provision serves a remedial need like that found in
Paradise or Sheet Metal Workers, the four-fifths rule will not be lifted for
the employer who has met the four-fifths or eighty percent proportion.319
The four-fifths rule continues to be enforced for every aspect of a
business‘s operation and, therefore, is not likely temporary.320 In effect, the
313. Post, supra note 189, at 67 n.306.
314. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (―We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions
programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end
point.‖).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 343; see also Johnson, supra note 311, at 182–85 (discussing the justifications
for time limits, institutional competence to establish time limits, and whether time limits are
realistic).
317. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180–81 (1987) (concluding that a goal
of twenty-five percent representation is an appropriate goal to remedy past discrimination);
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 440–41 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (refusing to question the lower court‘s order for twenty-nine percent
minority representation).
318. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 176 (acknowledging that judicial oversight would end
once the Alabama Department for Public Safety had satisfied the district court‘s order);
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (stating that the district court‘s order was temporary
and would end as soon as the ―percentage of minority union members approximate[d] the
percentage of minorities in the local labor force‖).
319. See supra Part I.C.
320. See supra Part I.C.

four-fifths rule seeks to maintain a balanced work force, contrary to the
Court‘s prohibition, not merely to attain one.321
If the four-fifths rule is not itself a time limit, then a limit must be set for
the disparate impact provision. Because Justice O‘Connor contemplated a
durational limit for diversity, a similar limit could be imposed for the
disparate impact provision if its intended purpose is diversity. There is,
however, some lack of clarity with Justice O‘Connor‘s statement. First, it
is not clear whether Justice O‘Connor contemplated a twenty-five year
durational limit or a fifty year limit because of her reference to Justice
Powell‘s approval of diversity in Bakke, which occurred twenty-five years
before Grutter.322 Second, it is unclear whether Justice O‘Connor would
expect a similar limit for race-conscious programs designed to advance
other non-remedial interests, like providing role models, meeting
occupational needs, and providing equal employment opportunities.
Assuming that Justice O‘Connor‘s expectation also applies to nonremedial goals, it is necessary to assess whether the disparate impact
provision complies with the twenty-five year or fifty year durational limit.
In the circumstance of race-conscious admissions programs, a school‘s
compliance with the durational limit set by Justice O‘Connor could easily
be determined from the date of an admissions program‘s application. For
the disparate impact provision, there are three ways to measure its
compliance with Justice O‘Connor‘s durational limit: using the year when
the Court adopted the disparate impact theory, when the EEOC established
the four-fifths rule, or when Congress promulgated the disparate impact
provision.
If one measures the disparate impact provision‘s compliance with the
time limit from the year the Court began applying the disparate impact
theory in Griggs (1971),323 the provision has exceeded Justice O‘Connor‘s
twenty-five year durational limit. Similarly, if one uses the four-fifths
rule‘s passage date (1978),324 the provision again would fail the twenty-five
year durational limit. If, however, one uses the year of the provision‘s

321. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court disapproved of government programs designed
to maintain racial balances. 478 U.S. 421, 476 (1986). In Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, the Supreme Court emphasized that the approved plan ―was intended to attain a
balanced work force, not to maintain one.‖ 480 U.S. 616, 639 (1987). Although Johnson
involved an issue of gender rather than racial discrimination and was reviewed under Title
VII because the parties did not raise a constitutional question, the Court‘s distinction
between attaining and maintaining a balanced work force is applicable to the issue at hand.
See id. at 622 (explaining that the EEOC‘s challenged plan had an eventual goal of thirty-six
percent female representation).
322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
323. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
324. See supra text accompanying note 48.

congressional passage (1991),325 the provision would be in compliance
until the year 2016. If one applies the fifty year durational limit, the
disparate impact provision would be in compliance regardless of the
method of measurement.
VII. NECESSITY AND RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES
A. The Importance of Race-Neutral Alternatives
To demonstrate that the use of racial classifications is necessary, the
government must show the unavailability or ineffectiveness of race-neutral
alternatives to achieve its goal.326 Croson required the government to
exhaust race-neutral alternatives before resorting to racial classifications.327
In Croson, the city failed to consider any race-neutral alternatives.328 It
seemed logical to the Court that the city should have investigated raceneutral alternatives because the city cited many race neutral barriers to
minority participation. The Court suggested race-neutral alternatives, such
as city financing for small firms if Minority Business Enterprises
disproportionately lacked capital,329 ―increas[ing] the accessibility of city
contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races[,]‖ and also
―[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged
entrepreneurs of all races.‖330
Although Grutter did ―not require exhaustion of every conceivable raceneutral alternative,‖331 it held that ―[n]arrow tailoring does, however,
require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives.‖332 Later in Parents Involved, the plurality reiterated Grutter‘s

325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
326. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (―Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives . . . .‖); Robinson, supra note
212, at 285 (construing the Court‘s rejection of racial classification in Parents Involved as a
result of ―the plans‘ limited impact‖ that ―indicated that alternative approaches would
accomplish the same goals,‖ and was thus not narrowly tailored).
327. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (reasoning that
the set-aside program was not narrowly tailored because there were multiple race-neutral
alternatives that could lead to greater minority participation in the construction industry).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 509–10.
331. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. The Court‘s relaxation of narrow tailoring was perhaps
due to a presumption of good faith on the part of the school. See id. at 329 (―Our conclusion
that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our
view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School‘s proper
institutional mission, and that ‗good faith‘ on the part of a university is ‗presumed‘ absent ‗a
showing to the contrary.‘‖).
332. Id. at 339.

requirement to examine race-neutral alternatives and criticized the districts
for failing to make such considerations.333
In contrast, the programs in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise were
narrowly tailored because there were no other alternatives to the raceconscious programs. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court approved of
―stronger measures‖ because the district court had already considered
alternative remedies in light of the union‘s deliberate delays in carrying out
the district court‘s initial remedial order.334 Because of similar ―foot
dragging‖ in Paradise, the Court also found that the lower court adequately
considered other alternatives.335 In both Paradise and Sheet Metal
Workers, the proposed alternatives fell short of addressing the long term,
pervasive discrimination caused by the government.336 Thus, when the
government uses racial classifications, it must at least show it has
considered race-neutral alternatives.
B. Race-Neutral Alternatives for the Disparate Impact Provision‘s Racial
Classifications
The disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications may not be
narrowly tailored if there are neutral alternatives available. Consideration
of the availability of neutral alternatives depends on the compelling
purpose for the provision‘s use of race. If the provision is intended to
remedy past discrimination, there are possible alternatives to explore such
as providing preparatory testing materials,337 training,338 or financial aid.339
If the compelling purpose of the provision is to increase diversity or
provide equal opportunities, those same alternatives could be explored.
Additionally, sensitivity training could be provided to promote the crossracial understanding that is believed to derive from diversity.340
333. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735
(2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
334. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481
(1986).
335. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 174–78 (1987) (―Not only was the
immediate promotion of blacks to the rank of corporal essential, but, if the need for
continuing judicial oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Department be
required to develop a procedure without adverse impact on blacks, and that the effect of past
delays be eliminated.‖).
336. Id. at 171; Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 481.
337. The firefighters in Ricci were required to purchase their own test materials, which
cost approximately $500. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009).
338. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (suggesting training as an alternative).
339. See id. at 510 (suggesting financial aid as an alternative). In Griggs, the employer
funded two-thirds of the tuition costs for high school training. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
340. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (discussing the benefits of
diversity in the educational context, such as breaking down racial stereotypes, fostering

Perhaps the one compelling interest where there is no available raceneutral alternative is meeting an operational need. An employer is most
likely to show the unavailability of race-neutral alternatives when raceconscious decisions are made for authenticity, such as conducting
investigations to infiltrate a racial gang, as Justice Stevens has
contemplated.341
This discussion is not meant to suggest that there are easy cures for the
ills that the disparate impact provision‘s racial classifications are meant to
address. But there must be evidence that the government has considered
alternatives before imposing the provision‘s racial classifications on
employers.
VIII. THE SURVIVAL OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION
The survival of the disparate impact provision against an Equal
Protection Clause challenge rests upon whether the provision‘s use of racial
classifications functions like rigid quotas, is flexible and affords
individualized decisions, is overinclusive or underinclusive, is temporary in
duration, and is necessary in light of good faith considerations of raceneutral alternatives. The disparate impact provision fails the narrow
tailoring requirement under all these criteria.
The provision‘s four-fifths rule risks being labeled a quota. Legislative
history reveals that the predominant concern with the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which codified disparate impact and its predecessor, was this very
issue of the Act being a ―quota bill.‖342 The analysis in this Article does
not rely on those generalized fears expressed during the passage of the Act
but rather on the functionality of the four-fifths rule that was overlooked
during the two years of debates preceding the Act. It is difficult to
distinguish the four-fifths rule from a quota because it effectively insulates
a percentage of applicants from competition and uses race as the only
factor in determining prima facie violations, which is antithetical to the
characteristics of the permissible goal in Grutter.
If the disparate impact provision is a quota, it will naturally fail the
requirement for flexibility or individualized decisions that the Court has
favored as permissible goals. The provision lacks the flexibility of the
goals in Grutter, Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, and Harvard‘s program
empathy and understanding for those of different races, encouraging livelier class room
discussion, and preparing students for diverse workforces).
341. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Fifth Circuit has approved of using race as a basis of assignment for undercover agents.
See Perez v. FBI, 707 F. Supp. 891, 912 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff‘d 956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir.
1992) (stating that ―Title VII may not prohibit the Bureau from assigning Hispanic Special
Agents to undercover work in disproportionate numbers‖).
342. 137 CONG. REC. 30633 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).

that was endorsed by Bakke. The provision, specifically the four-fifths
rule, does not fluctuate with the needs of the employer or the compelling
interest sought to be achieved by the provision. Whether the objective of
the provision is to remedy past discrimination, smoke out discrimination,
increase diversity, provide role models, meet an operational need, or
eliminate unnecessary and arbitrary barriers to employment, the four-fifths
rule is constant.
The provision‘s inflexibility affects its ability to provide the type of
individualized decisions that were critical in the Court‘s approval of
Grutter and invalidation of Gratz. Whether a plaintiff has a prima facie
case of disparate impact against an employer is determined on the basis of
race alone and does not include a ―holistic‖ review of the case.
Additionally, the provision is not narrowly tailored in duration or scope.
Regardless of the compelling interest that may justify racial classifications,
the Court has insisted that such classifications be temporary. The disparate
impact provision does not provide sunset provisions or indicate ―a logical
stopping point.‖
The provision‘s four-fifths rule also potentially suffers from being
overinclusive and underinclusive, which affects evaluation of its scope.
Assuming that researchers took into consideration the four-fifths rule‘s
allowance for sample size and statistical significance, the rule‘s
susceptibility to false positive and false negative errors could lead to underenforcement of the provision when an adverse impact exists and overenforcement when an adverse impact does not exist. Governmental racial
classifications that are overinclusive or underinclusive undermine the
necessity of the classifications and suggest that other alternatives are
available.
Finally, the provision‘s racial classifications must be necessary to
achieving its compelling interest, which depends on consideration of raceneutral alternatives. Of the six compelling interests identified earlier, only
in one circumstance would the provision‘s racial classifications be
necessary to achieve its objective. If there is a compelling need to use
racial classifications for authenticity such as for investigative purposes,
race-neutral alternatives would not be available. The availability of raceneutral alternatives for the other possible compelling interests would negate
the disparate impact provision‘s justified reliance upon racial
classifications.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia warned in Ricci that ―the war between disparate impact
and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to
begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between

them.‖343 The purpose of this Article has been to analyze the disparate
impact provision under the doctrinal demands of strict scrutiny and equal
protection to determine if peace is possible, rather than to predict the
outcome of future cases or make normative arguments.
In my earlier work, I explored the compelling interests that might justify
the
disparate
impact
provision‘s
racial
classifications.
I preliminarily concluded that the removal of barriers to achieve equal
employment opportunities is the most promising compelling interest that
might bring peace between the disparate impact provision and the Equal
Protection Clause.344 This Article completes the analysis necessary to
answer the question posed by Justice Scalia by addressing the second prong
of strict scrutiny—narrow tailoring. While remedying past discrimination,
smoking out discrimination, enhancing diversity, providing role models,
satisfying operational need, and providing equal employment opportunities
may be laudable goals, the disparate impact provision‘s means of achieving
them are inadequate to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. An
inability to show that the disparate impact provision‘s means fit its ends
may, in fact, be fatal when ―the evil day‖ comes.
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344. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 89.

